Tukaram v State of Maharashtra (1979): The Mathura Case, Consent and the Burden of Proof

Tukaram v State of Maharashtra, popularly called the Mathura case, is reported at (1979) 2 SCC 143. The Supreme Court decided it on 15 September 1978. The judgment is about a charge of rape against two policemen, and the allegation was that it happened inside a police station.

The Court allowed the appeal and acquitted both accused. This blog explains, in plain words, how it reached that result, because the reasoning on Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, consent and the burden of proof is the part that appears in judiciary exam answers. It also deals with the case carefully, since it concerns a serious allegation of sexual violence.

The prosecution story

The two appellants were policemen attached to the Desai Gunj police station in March 1972. Tukaram was a Head Constable. Ganpat was a Constable. The complainant was Mathura, a young woman whose parents had died when she was a child. She lived with her brother Gama, and both worked as labourers.

Through her work visits she had come to know Ashok, who lived with Nunshi, and the two had decided to marry. On 26 March 1972, Gama lodged a report at the police station that Mathura had been kidnapped by Nunshi, her husband Laxman and Ashok. All of them, along with Mathura, were brought to the station, and statements were recorded. By about 10.30 p.m., the Head Constable who recorded the report, Baburao, told them to leave, and asked Gama to bring a copy of the entry of Mathura's birth.

Read Also: Hussainara Khatoon v Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1979)

According to the prosecution, as Mathura and her companions started to leave, the two appellants asked her to wait and told the others to move out. The prosecution said Ganpat then took her to the back of the building and raped her, and that Tukaram later touched her inappropriately but could not go further because he was heavily intoxicated.

Her relatives, waiting outside, grew suspicious when the lights went off and the door was closed from inside. Noise from them attracted a crowd. Mathura then came out and told her relatives what had happened. A report was recorded after the crowd was calmed down.

A doctor examined her the next day, around 8 p.m. on 27 March 1972. There were no injuries on her body. The doctor noted old ruptures of the hymen and estimated her age at between 14 and 16 years. The Chemical Examiner found no semen in the pubic hair or vaginal smears, but semen was found on her clothes and on Ganpat's pyjama.

Sessions Court and High Court took opposite views

The Sessions Judge, Chandrapur, acquitted both accused on 1 June 1974. He held there was no satisfactory evidence that Mathura was below 16 on the date of the incident. He found her testimony unreliable in parts. He accepted that sexual intercourse had probably happened, but said there is a world of difference between sexual intercourse and rape, and that rape had not been proved.

The Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) reversed the acquittal. It agreed on the age finding but accepted Mathura's account that intercourse took place with Ganpat, supported by the semen stains on the clothes. It said the Sessions Judge had erred in the difference between consent and passive submission. It reasoned that both accused were strangers to her, that she was alone at a police station late at night with a complaint by her brother pending there, and so the initiative must have come from the accused and she must have submitted out of fear.

The High Court convicted Ganpat under Section 376 and sentenced him to five years of rigorous imprisonment. It convicted Tukaram under Section 354 and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a year. It did not believe that Tukaram had tried to rape the girl.

The accused appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave. This is a useful fact for Mains answers, because the case shows an acquittal by a trial court, a reversal by the High Court and a final acquittal by the Supreme Court.

What the appellants argued

The appellants said there was no direct evidence about the nature of the girl's consent. It therefore had to be inferred from circumstances, and those circumstances did not show any fear or compulsion that could amount to passive submission. They also argued that the absence of injuries suggested a peaceful affair, that the claim of stiff resistance was false and that the claim of loud shouting was false.

Why the Supreme Court acquitted: three steps in the reasoning

Step one: the facts did not support a finding of fear

Koshal, J. agreed with the appellants' main contention. He pointed out that no marks of injury were found on Mathura, which went a long way to indicate that the intercourse was not a case of stiff resistance. The Court also said that the claim that she shouted loudly for help was a tissue of lies, and noted that the Sessions Judge and the High Court shared that view on these two points.

The High Court had relied mainly on the fact that she was in a police station in front of two persons in authority. The Supreme Court found two errors in that. First, it overlooked her own admission in cross-examination that after her statement was recorded, she and her brother had started leaving the station and were passing through the front door when Ganpat caught her. In that situation, the Court said, it would be preposterous to say she was so overawed by the appellants being persons in authority that she would not try to resist. Her natural impulse would be to shake off the hand and cry out for help.

The Court also noted that she did not appeal to her companions, who were her brother, her aunt and her lover. Her conduct in following Ganpat and allowing him to proceed made the Court feel that the consent in question could not be brushed aside as passive submission.

Step two: the onus on the prosecution never shifts

The second error was legal. The Court said that the onus is always on the prosecution to prove affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it seeks to establish, and that this onus never shifts. So it was for the prosecution to show that all the ingredients of Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code were present.

The Court quoted Section 375, as it stood then, which described rape as sexual intercourse with a woman under five circumstances. The first is against her will. The second is without her consent. The third is with her consent, when it has been obtained by putting her in fear of death or of hurt. The fourth is where the man knows he is not her husband and she consents because she believes he is another man to whom she is or believes herself lawfully married. The fifth is where she is under sixteen years of age, with or without consent.

The Court observed that the section itself, in the clauses Thirdly and Fourthly, states when a consent would not be a consent for the purpose of clause Secondly. To show that consent was missing here, the State could rely only on clause Thirdly. That meant it had to prove that the girl had been put in fear of death or hurt and that this fear was the reason for her consent.

The High Court had talked of passive submission and fear, but it never gave a finding that the fear was of death or hurt. Without that finding, the Court said, the alleged fear would not vitiate consent.

Step three: circumstantial evidence must point only to guilt

The Court also said a basic rule: when circumstantial evidence is used to prove an ingredient of an offence, it must lead to no reasonable inference other than that of guilt. Here, the fear mentioned in clause Thirdly was negatived by the fact that Mathura was taken away from among her near and dear ones, at a time when they were all leaving the police station together and crossing the entrance gate.

So the circumstantial evidence was not only capable of being read differently from how the High Court read it. It actually derogated, in no uncertain measure, from the High Court's inference. The Court concluded that the intercourse in question was not proved to amount to rape and that no offence was brought home to Ganpat.

What happened to Tukaram's conviction

The only allegation found proved against Tukaram by the High Court was that he touched the complainant improperly after Ganpat left her. The Supreme Court noted that in the first information report, the complainant had made serious allegations against Tukaram, saying that he had caught hold of her first and taken her to the rear. At trial, she went back on these and attributed those acts to Ganpat.

The Court asked a simple question. If she could alter her position on those serious allegations at will, what assurance is there that her word is truthful about the other allegation against Tukaram? It also said that the High Court appeared to be influenced by the fact that Tukaram was present at the police station and left after the incident. That circumstance, in the Court's opinion, is not inculpatory and is capable of more explanations than one.

The Court therefore declined to take the girl at her word in relation to Tukaram and held the charge wholly unproved against him. The appeal was accepted, the High Court judgment was reversed and the convictions and sentences were set aside.

Points to carry into your exam answers

·        Burden of proof: the onus is on the prosecution to prove every ingredient, and it never shifts.

·        Consent and fear: under Section 375 as it stood in the judgment, fear vitiates consent only if it is fear of death or of hurt, as stated in clause Thirdly.

·        Circumstantial evidence: it must lead to no reasonable inference other than guilt.

·        Inconsistent statements: a witness who changes her account of serious allegations affects how far her word can be relied on for other allegations.

·        Appellate courts: the High Court itself recorded the principle that reversing an acquittal is not justified where the trial court's view was reasonably possible.

A caution for exam use: this judgment applies Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code as it stood when the judgment was given. For the exam, always check the current text of the provision in your Bare Act and use this case only for what it actually decided.

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Frequently Asked Questions About the Mathura Case

What is the citation of Tukaram v State of Maharashtra?

It is reported as 1979 AIR 185, 1979 SCR (1) 810 and (1979) 2 SCC 143.

When did the Supreme Court decide it, and who was on the bench?

The judgment is dated 15 September 1978. The bench was A.D. Koshal, Jaswant Singh and P.S. Kailasam, JJ., and Koshal, J. delivered it.

Who were the accused?

Tukaram, a Head Constable, and Ganpat, a Constable, both attached to the Desai Gunj police station.

What did the Sessions Court decide?

The Sessions Judge, Chandrapur, acquitted both accused on 1 June 1974, saying rape had not been proved.

What did the High Court do?

The Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) reversed the acquittal. It convicted Ganpat under Section 376 with five years of rigorous imprisonment and Tukaram under Section 354 with one year of rigorous imprisonment.

What was the Supreme Court's main legal point on the burden of proof?

That the onus is always on the prosecution to prove affirmatively each ingredient of the offence, and it never shifts.

Why did the Court say clause Thirdly of Section 375 did not apply?

Because the High Court gave no finding that the girl's consent was obtained by putting her in fear of death or hurt, and the facts showed she was taken away from among her near and dear ones while leaving the police station.

What did the Court say about circumstantial evidence?

It must be such that it leads to no reasonable inference other than that of guilt. Here the circumstances could be read differently and actually pointed against the High Court's inference.

Why was Tukaram's conviction set aside?

Because the complainant had changed her account of serious allegations against him between the FIR and the trial, and his presence at the police station was not inculpatory.

How should this case be used in exam answers?

Use it for the burden of proof, the meaning of consent under Section 375 as it then stood, and the standard for circumstantial evidence, and always check the current provision in your Bare Act.

Learning From the Mathura Case

Tukaram v State of Maharashtra (1979) 2 SCC 143 is a case that rewards careful reading. Its legal lessons are about the burden of proof, the exact language of Section 375, and the standard for circumstantial evidence. Read the judgment's reasoning carefully, and write about it with the same care.

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