Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018): The Sabarimala Verdict and the Test of Constitutional Morality

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 1 | (2019) 11 SCC 1 | W.P. (Civil) No. 373 of 2006

Decided: 28 September 2018

Bench: Five-judge Constitution Bench — CJI Dipak Misra (for himself and Justice A.M. Khanwilkar), Justice R.F. Nariman, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, and Justice Indu Malhotra Result: 4:1 majority — Justice Indu Malhotra dissenting

Introduction

Can a centuries-old temple custom that bars women of menstruating age from entering a place of worship survive constitutional scrutiny?

On 28 September 2018, the Supreme Court of India said no, by a majority of 4:1. In Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala — widely known as the Sabarimala case — a five-judge Constitution Bench struck down Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which had given statutory backing to the practice of excluding women between ten and fifty years from the Sabarimala temple.

The majority held that the exclusion violated Articles 14, 15, 17, and 25 of the Constitution. It reaffirmed, in its most authoritative form, the doctrine of constitutional morality: the morality of the Constitution, not the moral consensus of the majority, is the standard by which religious customs and practices must be assessed.

For Civil Judge Exam and PCS J Exam aspirants, this case is essential. It covers Articles 14, 15, 17, 25, and 26, the essential religious practices test, the doctrine of constitutional morality, and the relationship between gender equality and religious freedom. With a nine-judge bench judgment reserved in May 2026, it is among the most current and exam-relevant constitutional law topics.

Background: The Temple, the Tradition, and the Challenge

The Sabarimala temple, situated in the Periyar Tiger Reserve in Pathanamthitta District, Kerala, is one of India's largest pilgrimage sites, attracting more than fifty million devotees annually. It is dedicated to Lord Ayyappa, worshipped in his form as a Naishtik Brahmachari — a celibate deity who has taken a lifelong vow of chastity.

The long-standing custom of the temple was that women between the ages of ten and fifty — women of menstruating age — were prohibited from entering the temple. The justification offered was that the presence of women in their "fertile years" would disturb the deity's celibacy and violate the sanctity of the place of worship.

This practice was given statutory form by Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965. The Rules were framed under the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965. Rule 3(b) permitted the exclusion of women from places of public worship if such exclusion was based on a "custom."

In 1991, the Kerala High Court in S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore upheld the practice as a valid custom that did not violate fundamental rights.

In 2006, the Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a PIL under Article 32 before the Supreme Court. They were joined by other petitioners: Dr. Laxmi Shastri, Prerna Kumari, Alka Sharma, and Sudha Pal. The petition challenged the exclusionary practice and Rule 3(b) as violative of Articles 14, 15, 17, 19, 25, and 51A(e) of the Constitution.

After twelve years of litigation, a three-judge bench referred the matter to a five-judge Constitution Bench in October 2017. The Constitution Bench heard arguments and delivered its judgment on 28 September 2018.

The Legal Questions Before the Court

The Constitution Bench framed five questions:

1. Whether the exclusion of women aged 10-50 from the Sabarimala temple is an "essential religious practice" of the Ayyappa faith protected by Articles 25 and 26?

2. Whether the Ayyappa devotees constitute a "religious denomination" entitled to manage their own affairs under Article 26?

3. Whether Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules is violative of Articles 14, 15, and 25?

4. Whether the exclusionary practice amounts to a form of social discrimination prohibited by Article 17 read with Article 21?

5. Whether the protection of morality under Articles 25 and 26 refers to constitutional morality or social/religious morality?

The Four Majority Opinions

CJI Dipak Misra (for himself and Justice A.M. Khanwilkar): Constitutionalism, Equality, and the Devotee's Right

CJI Misra's opinion anchored the majority in the principle of constitutional morality and the inclusive nature of the right to worship.

On the Essential Religious Practice Test:

He held that the exclusion of women based on physiological factors — menstruation — is not an essential religious practice of the Ayyappa faith. The essential practice test asks: is the practice so fundamental to the religion that without it, the religion itself would be altered? Menstruation is a biological reality, not a theological necessity. The deity's celibacy does not logically require the exclusion of women who menstruate.

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On Constitutional Morality:

CJI Misra held that courts must test religious practices against constitutional morality, not social morality. Social morality is the prevailing moral consensus of the community. Constitutional morality is the set of values — equality, dignity, liberty, fraternity — embedded in the Constitution.

When the two conflict, constitutional morality must prevail. The courts are the guardians of constitutional morality, and their role is precisely to protect individual and minority rights from the tyranny of social convention, however ancient or widespread.

On Article 17:

The majority held that the exclusion of women based on menstruation is an assertion that they are impure or polluted during those days. This is a physiological form of untouchability — exclusion from a public place of worship based on a bodily characteristic. Such exclusion falls within the spirit and purpose of Article 17, which abolishes untouchability in all its forms.

On Rule 3(b):

Rule 3(b), which permitted exclusion of women based on "custom," was struck down as unconstitutional. It violated Articles 14 (arbitrary exclusion without rational basis), 15(1) (discrimination on the ground of sex), and 25(1) (right of all persons to freely profess, practise, and propagate religion).

On Devotion Cannot Be Subjected to Physiological Conditions:

CJI Misra held that the right to worship is equally available to all persons regardless of gender. A woman's ability to participate in religious life cannot be made conditional on her biological characteristics. Devotion is a matter of the mind and the spirit, not the body.

Justice R.F. Nariman: Article 25 and the Equal Right to Worship

Justice Nariman concurred, holding that the right to worship under Article 25(1) is available equally to men and women. The phrase "all persons" in Article 25(1) includes women of all ages. Any practice that restricts this equal right on the basis of gender violates Article 25 itself.

He applied the manifest arbitrariness test from Article 14: the distinction drawn between women of fertile age and all other persons — based on menstruation — has no rational basis connected to any legitimate constitutional purpose. It is manifestly arbitrary.

He also held that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate "religious denomination" for the purposes of Article 26. The Ayyappa devotees are part of the broader Hindu faith and do not have a distinct identity, creed, and doctrinal system that would qualify them as a separate denomination.

If they are not a separate denomination, they cannot invoke Article 26 to manage their affairs contrary to the constitutional rights of others.

Justice D.Y. Chandrachud: Dignity, Privacy, and the Body as Sacred

Justice Chandrachud's opinion is the most philosophically rich of the four majority opinions. He identified multiple layers to the constitutional violation.

On Treating Menstruation as Impurity:

He held that the exclusion of women of menstruating age from Sabarimala is premised on the assumption that menstruation renders women impure or polluting. This is not a neutral religious rule. It is a cultural assertion that the female body, in its most natural biological state, is intrinsically problematic.

This assumption violates the right to dignity under Article 21. It also violates informational and decisional privacy — the right of a woman to control how her body is perceived and judged.

On the Essential Practices Test:

Justice Chandrachud applied the essential practices test rigorously and found the exclusion non-essential. The essential practice of the Ayyappa faith is devotion to Lord Ayyappa. That practice does not require the exclusion of women. The exclusion is a contingent social custom, not a theological necessity.

He went further, questioning whether courts should be applying the essential practices test to assess which religious practices deserve constitutional protection at all. He expressed concern that this test puts courts in the position of deciding which aspects of a religion are "essential" — a task for which courts may not be equipped. He proposed instead a direct fundamental rights analysis: does the practice violate equality, dignity, or liberty?

On Constitutional Morality:

Justice Chandrachud held that the constitutional morality doctrine requires courts to protect individuals and minorities from majoritarian overreach, even in the religious sphere. A practice that has the sanction of tradition is not thereby insulated from constitutional scrutiny.

On Article 17:

He agreed with CJI Misra that the exclusion based on biological characteristics constitutes a form of untouchability prohibited by Article 17.

On Patriarchy in Religion:

Justice Chandrachud made the broader observation that many religious practices that subordinate women are rooted in patriarchal social structures, not in genuine theological necessity. The Constitution's guarantee of equality does not permit patriarchy to shelter behind religious freedom.

The Dissent: Justice Indu Malhotra

Justice Indu Malhotra's dissent is the most discussed single opinion in this case. She disagreed with the majority on three central grounds.

1. Notions of Religion Are Not Subject to Constitutional Scrutiny Under Rationality

Justice Malhotra held that religious beliefs — including what a particular religious community holds to be sacred or essential — are not subject to judicial scrutiny through the lens of constitutional rationality. The Constitution protects the right of religious communities to define and practise their faith.

She held that it is not for the Court to determine whether a religious practice is "essential" or "rational." Different communities have different beliefs, and those beliefs must be respected within the framework of religious freedom.

2. Standing: Non-Devotees Cannot Challenge a Religious Practice

Justice Malhotra held that the petitioners — the Indian Young Lawyers Association and others — were not devotees of Lord Ayyappa. They had no personal stake in the worship at Sabarimala. Non-devotees cannot file a writ petition challenging the religious practices of a community to which they do not belong. This is not a matter of public interest — it is a matter of the community's internal religious affair.

She held that only affected devotees — women who sought to worship at Sabarimala and were denied — would have the standing to challenge the practice.

3. The Majority's Approach Unsettles All Religion

Justice Malhotra expressed deep concern about the precedent being set. If constitutional courts apply equality and rationality standards to religious practices, no traditional religious practice that makes any distinction — between men and women, between different castes, between initiated and uninitiated — will be safe. She held that the inevitable consequence of the majority's reasoning would be the constitutionalisation of all religious practices, with courts as the ultimate arbiters of what is acceptable religion.

She concluded that the issues raised have serious and unprecedented ramifications for various religions practiced across India.

The Aftermath: Implementation Challenges and the Review

The 2019 Entry of Women and Protests

After the judgment, attempts by women activists to enter the Sabarimala temple were initially blocked. On 2 January 2019, two women — Bindu Ammini and Kanakadurga — became the first women of menstruating age to enter the Sabarimala sanctum in recent memory, doing so under police protection. Their entry provoked further protests and violence across Kerala.

The 2019 Review: Referral to Nine-Judge Bench

More than 50 review petitions were filed challenging the 2018 judgment. In November 2019, a five-judge bench by a 3:2 majority kept the review petitions pending and referred broader constitutional questions to a nine-judge bench, including:

• What is the scope and nature of the right to religion under Article 25 and Article 26?
• How does the right to equality under Articles 14 and 15 interact with rights under Article 25 and 26?
• Does the essential religious practices test provide the correct framework for testing religious claims?

The 2018 judgment continued to operate in the interim.

The 2026 Nine-Judge Bench: Judgment Reserved

In the most significant development for this case since 2019, a nine-judge Constitution Bench, presided over by CJI Surya Kant, heard arguments for 16 days beginning 7 April 2026. The bench reserved judgment on 14 May 2026. This judgment, when it comes, will decisively settle the broader constitutional questions about religion, equality, and essential practices — not just for Sabarimala, but for every similar religious practice across India. 

The Five Articles Violated: A Clean Reference

POV Section: What This Means for Judiciary Aspirants

Prelims

Expect direct questions on the case name (Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala), citation (AIR 2019 SC 1 / (2019) 11 SCC 1), bench (five-judge Constitution Bench, CJI Dipak Misra), date (28 September 2018), and the result (4:1 majority). Know the provision struck down (Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules). Know the Articles involved (14, 15, 17, 25, 26). Know who dissented (Justice Indu Malhotra) and why. The 2026 nine-judge bench development (arguments heard April-May 2026, judgment reserved) is critical current affairs.

Mains

Your written answer must cover: the Sabarimala temple background; the five legal questions; all four majority opinions with their distinct emphases; Justice Malhotra's dissent (three grounds); the five Articles violated; the aftermath (2019 review, referral to nine-judge bench); and the 2026 nine-judge bench status. A strong answer will also discuss the tension between the essential religious practices test and a direct fundamental rights approach (as articulated by Justice Chandrachud), and the broader implications for religious practices involving gender distinctions.

Interview (Viva)

Panels often ask: "What is the Sabarimala judgment?" "What is constitutional morality?" "What did the dissent say?" "What is the essential religious practices test?" This case gives you a rich, multi-layered answer to all four questions. Be ready to discuss the three-way tension: between equality rights (majority), religious freedom of the community (Article 25, 26 — the State's position), and the threshold for judicial intervention in religious practices (Justice Malhotra's concern). Also flag the 2026 nine-judge bench development.

Conclusion

Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala is one of the most debated constitutional judgments of the twenty-first century. It took a centuries-old custom, held it up to the light of Articles 14, 15, 17, and 25, and found it wanting. It said that devotion cannot be conditioned on biology, that equality does not stop at the temple door, and that the morality of the Constitution is not the same as the morality of any particular community.

And it is not over. With a nine-judge bench having reserved judgment in May 2026, the final word on this case — and on the broader questions of religion, equality, and essential practices in India — is still to come.

For your Civil Judge Exam, PCS J Exam, or any judiciary exam, this is one of the most rich and multi-dimensional cases in all of constitutional law.

At Aashayein Judiciary, Nitesh Sir covers the Sabarimala case in complete depth — including all four majority opinions, the dissent, the review proceedings, and the 2026 nine-judge bench development — so aspirants are fully prepared for every angle of this case at every level of their examination.

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Frequently Asked Questions

Q1. What did the Supreme Court decide in the Sabarimala case?

 A five-judge Constitution Bench held by a 4:1 majority on 28 September 2018 that the practice of excluding women between the ages of ten and fifty from the Sabarimala temple is unconstitutional. It struck down Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 as violative of Articles 14, 15, 17, and 25 of the Constitution.

Q2. What is constitutional morality and how was it applied in this case?

Constitutional morality refers to the values embedded in the Constitution — equality, dignity, liberty, and fraternity — as distinct from social morality, which is the moral consensus of the majority at any given time. The majority held that when the two conflict, constitutional morality must prevail. The centuries-old custom of excluding women may have had the sanction of social morality, but it violated the constitutional morality embedded in Articles 14, 15, 17, and 25.

Q3. What was Justice Indu Malhotra's dissent about?

 Justice Malhotra dissented on three grounds: first, religious beliefs and practices are not subject to constitutional scrutiny through rationality review; second, the petitioners (non-devotees) lacked standing to challenge the practice; and third, applying equality standards to religious practices would have serious ramifications for religious communities across India. She held that only affected devotees could challenge the exclusion, and that the issues raised should be left to the wisdom of the community itself.

Q4. Is the Sabarimala judgment still operative?

 Yes. The 2018 judgment remains operative. In November 2019, a five-judge bench referred broader constitutional questions about religion and equality to a nine-judge bench. A nine-judge Constitution Bench (presided over by CJI Surya Kant) heard arguments for 16 days from 7 April 2026 and reserved judgment on 14 May 2026. When the nine-judge bench judgment is delivered, it will definitively settle the constitutional questions for all religious practices involving gender distinctions.

Q5. What is the essential religious practices test and why does it matter in this case?

The essential religious practices test asks whether a particular practice is so fundamental to a religion that without it, the religion itself would be substantially altered. If a practice is "essential," it receives protection under Articles 25 and 26. The majority held that the exclusion of women is not an essential practice of the Ayyappa faith — devotion to Lord Ayyappa does not require the exclusion of women of menstruating age. Justice Chandrachud also questioned whether this test provides the right framework, suggesting a direct fundamental rights analysis instead.