Parveen Kumar Chauhan v. State of Haryana & Others (2026): Case Summary, Judgment & Key Takeaways

State Remission Policy Under Article 161 Cannot Be Overridden by Later Statute: SC Holds

Case: Citation: 2026 INSC 667 | 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1250

Case No.: Criminal Appeal [@ SLP (Crl.) No. 9920 of 2026]

Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol (author) and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh

Introduction

Can a State government take away a life convict's right to apply for early release under a constitutional policy, simply by issuing a new policy under an ordinary statute?

The Supreme Court of India answered this clearly on 1 July 2026. In Parveen Kumar v. State of Haryana, the Court held that a remission policy framed by the State Government in exercise of the Governor's constitutional powers under Article 161 of the Constitution cannot be overridden or superseded by a later statutory policy issued under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court also declared its own 2021 judgment in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar as per incuriam, finding it to be contrary to a binding three-judge bench decision.

Background: Who Is Parveen Kumar and What Is the Dispute?

Parveen Kumar was convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC in 2009 for the killing of a 12-year-old child. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

After serving approximately 14 years of actual imprisonment, he applied in May 2022 for premature release under Haryana's 2002 remission policy. When no decision was taken on his application, he approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court directed the authorities to consider his representation.

The State of Haryana then formally rejected his application. The ground for rejection was straightforward: Parveen Kumar was governed by the 2008 Premature Release Policy, not the 2002 policy. Under the 2008 policy, a life convict must serve a minimum of 20 years of actual imprisonment and 25 years of total sentence before becoming eligible for premature release. Since he had served only about 14 years, he was not eligible under the 2008 policy.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court, relying on the 2021 Supreme Court decision in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, dismissed his writ petition.

Parveen Kumar appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Two Policies at the Centre of the Dispute

Understanding the distinction between Haryana's two remission policies is the key to understanding the entire case.

Haryana's 2002 Policy (Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts)

Issued on 12 April 2002. The critical feature of this policy was its mechanism: it required the papers of eligible life convicts to be placed before the Governor for orders under Article 161 of the Constitution of India.

Article 161 is the constitutional provision vesting in the Governor of a State the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, and remissions of punishment in respect of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends.

Since the 2002 policy explicitly invoked the Governor's role under Article 161, its source of power was the Constitution itself.

Under the 2002 policy, a life convict could become eligible for premature release after serving approximately 14 years of actual imprisonment, subject to certain conditions and the Governor's approval.

Haryana's 2008 Policy (Premature Release of Life Convicts Policy)

Issued on 13 August 2008. This policy explicitly invoked Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973 as its source of power. It required files to be placed before the Chief Minister for approval, not the Governor.

Under the 2008 policy, a life convict had to serve a minimum of 20 years of actual imprisonment and 25 years of total sentence before consideration.

The 2008 policy expressly stated that it superseded all earlier government memorandums and policies on premature release.

The crucial question before the Supreme Court was: can this statutory policy (2008), deriving its authority from an ordinary statute (CrPC), supersede a constitutional policy (2002) deriving its authority from Article 161 of the Constitution?

The Earlier Precedents: Jagdish (2010) and Raj Kumar (2021)

State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) 4 SCC 216

This three-judge bench judgment directly addressed Haryana's 1993 remission policy, which was materially identical to the 2002 policy in that it also required the Governor to exercise power under Article 161.

The Jagdish bench held that Haryana's 1993 policy was an exercise of power under Article 161 of the Constitution. The Governor's power under Article 161 is constitutionally independent, untouched by any statutory provision. The bench also held that the most liberal remission policy applicable to a convict must be applied to them at the time of consideration.

State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2021)

A two-judge bench in Raj Kumar held that Haryana's 2002 policy did not expressly state that it was issued in exercise of powers under Article 161. Because the 2002 policy merely mentioned the Governor and did not explicitly cite Article 161 as its source, the two-judge bench treated it as a statutory policy traceable to the CrPC, not a constitutional policy. On this reasoning, the 2008 policy validly superseded the 2002 policy.

This created a direct conflict with Jagdish. The Jagdish three-judge bench had held the identically structured 1993 policy to be constitutional in character. The Raj Kumar two-judge bench had reached the opposite conclusion about the 2002 policy, without acknowledging or distinguishing the larger bench decision in Jagdish.

It was this conflict that the 2026 judgment in Parveen Kumar resolved.

What the Supreme Court Held

Justice Sanjay Karol, writing for the bench, allowed the appeal and directed the State of Haryana to decide Parveen Kumar's premature release application under the 2002 policy within four weeks.

The judgment rests on five clear propositions.

1. The 2002 Policy Is Constitutional in Character

The Court examined the text of both Haryana's 1993 policy (held constitutional in Jagdish) and the 2002 policy. Both policies required that remission papers be placed before the Governor to solicit orders under Article 161 of the Constitution. Both were issued through the same office and followed the same mechanism.

The Court held that since Jagdish had already authoritatively declared the 1993 policy to be an exercise of constitutional power under Article 161, the only available conclusion for the identically structured 2002 policy was that it was also constitutional in character.

The Court stated: <cite index="38-1">"the policies of 1993 and 2002 are identical in terms of their source of power under Article 161, and since the former has been declared by a bench of three judges to be an exercise under constitutional power, the inescapable conclusion would be that the identical later policy would also be the same."</cite>

2. A Statutory Policy Cannot Override a Constitutional Policy

The Court articulated a foundational constitutional principle. The Governor's power under Article 161 is a constitutional power: independent, distinct, and untouched by any ordinary statute. A statutory policy, meaning one whose source of authority is an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature, cannot override, diminish, or supersede the exercise of a constitutional power.

The Court was unequivocal: a statutory policy cannot override an exercise of power under Article 161, for that power is distinct and independent, uninfluenced by any other power, more so statutory in nature.

This principle establishes a clear hierarchy: constitutional power is supreme. Statutory power, however widely framed, cannot abridge constitutional power. The 2008 policy, being rooted in Sections 432-433 CrPC, was a statutory policy. It could not supersede the 2002 policy, which was constitutional in origin.

3. State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2021) Is Per Incuriam

The Court held that the 2021 judgment in Raj Kumar, which had treated the 2002 policy as statutory in character, was per incuriam.

Per incuriam is a Latin phrase meaning "through carelessness" or "through lack of care." In legal terms, a judgment is per incuriam when it is decided without the court's attention being drawn to a relevant statute or binding precedent that would have made a material difference to the decision.

In this case, the two-judge bench in Raj Kumar had failed to consider the three-judge bench decision in Jagdish, which was a directly applicable and binding precedent on an identical question. A coordinate-strength bench (two judges) cannot depart from the ruling of a larger bench (three judges) without expressly disagreeing with it and referring the matter to an even larger bench. Since Raj Kumar departed from Jagdish without acknowledgment or reference, it was per incuriam and therefore not binding.

The Court also laid down a clear guideline on the per incuriam doctrine: where a coordinate bench judgment conflicts with a controlling larger bench precedent, it is rendered per incuriam without any need to refer the matter further, since the controlling precedent already provides the answer.

4. The Most Liberal Remission Policy Must Be Applied

Relying on the holding in Jagdish that the most beneficial remission policy must be applied to a convict at the time of consideration, the Court held that Parveen Kumar was entitled to have his application considered under the 2002 policy, which was more liberal than the 2008 policy.

The principle here is one of legitimate expectation and constitutional fairness. A convict who becomes eligible for remission consideration has a constitutional expectation that the most beneficial policy available will be applied to them. The State cannot unilaterally narrow their eligibility by substituting a stricter statutory policy for an earlier constitutional one.

5. Direction to State of Haryana

The Court directed the State of Haryana to consider and decide Parveen Kumar's application for premature release under the 2002 policy within four weeks from the date of the judgment.

The Constitutional Framework: Article 161 vs. Section 432/433 CrPC

For exam purposes, it is essential to understand the constitutional and statutory provisions in play.

Article 161 of the Constitution

Article 161 vests in the Governor of a State the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment, or to suspend, remit, or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends.

This is a constitutional power. It is exercised by the Governor personally, on the advice of the Council of Ministers (as held in subsequent case law). It is independent of any statutory provision.

Article 72 is the corresponding provision for the President at the Union level.

Section 432 CrPC (Now Section 473 BNSS) and Section 433 CrPC (Now Section 474 BNSS)

Section 432 CrPC empowered the appropriate government to suspend or remit any sentence, in whole or in part, with or without conditions. Section 433 CrPC allowed commutation of sentences.

These are statutory powers. They are distinct from the constitutional power under Article 161. A policy issued under these sections is a statutory policy, not a constitutional one.

Under the BNSS, 2023 (in force from 1 July 2024):

The Article 161 constitutional power is unchanged. No provision of the BNSS can limit or override it.

Key Distinction for Exam Answers

The Per Incuriam Doctrine: A Quick Reference

Since the judgment declares Raj Kumar (2021) per incuriam, aspirants must know this doctrine well.

Per incuriam means a judgment decided without reference to a relevant statute or binding precedent. Such a judgment is not binding on future courts.

When does per incuriam apply? A judgment is per incuriam when:

• A directly applicable and binding precedent was not brought to the court's attention
• Or a directly applicable statutory provision was overlooked
• And the overlooked authority or provision would have materially altered the decision

What is NOT per incuriam? A judgment is not per incuriam merely because it is wrong, distinguishable, or decided differently from another case. The basis must be a failure to notice a directly applicable binding precedent or statute.

The Court in this case was very precise: it was not differing with Raj Kumar. It was pointing out that Raj Kumar had decided a question without noticing the binding three-judge bench precedent in Jagdish that directly and conclusively answered the same question. That is the classic definition of per incuriam.

Why This Judgment Matters

It Protects the Constitutional Supremacy of Article 161

The Governor's pardon and remission powers are constitutionally guaranteed. They exist outside and above the ordinary statutory framework of criminal procedure. This judgment ensures that State Governments cannot erode these powers by simply issuing a more restrictive statutory policy and declaring that it supersedes everything that came before.

It Gives Life Convicts Certainty on the Most Liberal Policy

The Jagdish principle that the most beneficial policy must be applied is a significant protection for convicts seeking premature release. This judgment reaffirms that principle in the context of constitutionally-rooted policies.

It Corrects a Per Incuriam Binding Precedent

By declaring Raj Kumar per incuriam with careful reasoning rather than simply overruling it, the Court demonstrates a disciplined approach to precedent hierarchy. Coordinate-bench conflicts are resolved by returning to the controlling larger-bench precedent, not by creating new disputes that require further reference.

It Draws the Article 161/432 CrPC Boundary Precisely

Courts, practitioners, and convicts' advocates now have a clear statement of the constitutional-statutory divide in remission law. Any remission policy that channels files through the Governor under Article 161 is constitutional in character and immune to supersession by statutory policy.

Conclusion

Parveen Kumar v. State of Haryana is a judgment about constitutional supremacy in one of its most human forms: the right of a person serving a life sentence to have their eligibility for early release considered under the most liberal policy available under constitutional authority.

The Court's message is clear. The Constitution gives the Governor an independent, untouchable power to show mercy. A State Government cannot take that power back by issuing a stricter statutory rule and calling it a replacement. The constitutional source of power is supreme. It cannot be displaced by statutory sleight of hand.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q1. What did the Supreme Court decide in Parveen Kumar v. State of Haryana (2026)? The Supreme Court held that Haryana's 2002 remission policy, framed in exercise of the Governor's constitutional power under Article 161, could not be overridden by the 2008 statutory policy framed under Sections 432-433 CrPC. It declared the 2021 judgment in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar per incuriam and directed that Parveen Kumar's premature release application be decided under the more liberal 2002 policy.

Q2. What is the difference between Article 161 of the Constitution and Section 432 CrPC? Article 161 vests in the Governor a constitutional, independent power to grant pardons, remissions, and commutations. This power is not governed by any statute and cannot be limited by statute. Section 432 CrPC (now Section 473 BNSS) is a statutory power allowing the appropriate government to suspend or remit sentences within the framework of the Code. A statutory policy cannot override a constitutional power.

Q3. What does "per incuriam" mean and how was it applied in this case?

Per incuriam means a judgment decided without the court's attention being drawn to a binding precedent or statute that would have materially affected the outcome. In this case, the two-judge bench in Raj Kumar (2021) had failed to notice the controlling three-judge bench precedent in Jagdish (2010), which had already decided the identical question of the constitutional origin of Haryana's remission policies. Since Raj Kumar departed from Jagdish without acknowledgment, it was per incuriam.

Q4. What is the BNSS equivalent of Section 432 and Section 433 CrPC?

Section 432 CrPC (suspension or remission of sentence) is now Section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. Section 433 CrPC (commutation of sentence) is now Section 474 BNSS. Section 433A CrPC (restrictions on remission) is now Section 475 BNSS. These came into force on 1 July 2024. The constitutional power under Article 161 remains unchanged.

Q5. What is the principle that "the most liberal remission policy must be applied"?

This principle, drawn from State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) 4 SCC 216, holds that when considering a life convict's application for premature release, the authorities must apply the most beneficial or liberal remission policy that is available and applicable to the convict, rather than the strictest policy in force. This principle is rooted in constitutional fairness and legitimate expectation. The 2026 judgment reaffirmed this principle.